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Abstract—Deeper penetration of interoperable cyber-physical
distributed energy resources (DER) and their utility-wide re-
mote monitoring and control drastically increases cybersecurity
attack surface. Utilities require to adopt the DER interconnec-
tion and communication standards to a range of autonomous,
advanced and curve-based grid-support functions to securely
monitor and control DER devices for ensuring power quality,
voltage, and system frequency. In this paper, we present DER
monitoring and control (DERMC) cyber-physical system (CPS)
architecture including standard communication protocols such
as IEEE 2030.5 [1] and discuss various stealthy cyber attack
vectors that affect communications and operations of DER. We
propose a hardware-in-the-loop (HIL) CPS security architecture
and testbed design with industry-grade software and hardware
systems and a real-time digital simulator for high-fidelity grid
impact characteristic analysis against cyber attack vectors. We
use the testbed to demonstrate impact characteristics for modified
IEEE 13 bus system including 11 solar photovoltaic units. The
experiments demonstrated significant results by 100% real-time
performance and zero overruns.
Index Terms—CPS security, Distributed energy resource, DER
monitoring and control, DER communications, Hardware-in-the-
loop testbed, and Smart distribution grid.
I. INTRODUCTION
SECURE , reliable, and resilient operation of the moderncyber-physical power system including high penetration of
renewable resources is of paramount importance and critical
for the power utilities. The proliferation and widespread avail-
ability of cost-effective Distributed Energy Resources (DERs)
in electric distribution systems present many challenges and
opportunities for utilities on the planning and reliable opera-
tion of the active distribution grid. The increasing prevalence
of DER cyber-physical systems (CPS) and their common-
mode vulnerabilities may lead to cyber-threats and risk of
detaching substantial generation during peak demand. It could
cause power disruptions and instability in the grid operation.
While a traditional cyberattack on information technology (IT)
systems may leak credit-card or other sensitive information, a
CPS attack can lead to a loss of situational awareness and
control in the power grid, DERs, reactors, gas turbines, and
other critical infrastructure. Therefore, it becomes a significant
requirement to establish secure monitoring and control of
DERs by integrating cyber defensive strategies to ensure
reliable active distribution grid operation against cyber attacks.
It is more pronounced and essential to build cyber-secure in-
frastructure for real-time monitoring, control, and optimization
of DERs to cope with variability and bidirectional power flows.
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Fig. 1. Cyber-Physical Smart Distribution Grid including DERs
Fig. 1 shows a schematic of cyber-physical smart distri-
bution grid including DERs. Increasing penetration of DER
devices such as solar photovoltaic (PV), wind, battery en-
ergy storage systems (BESS), electric vehicles (EV), and EV
charging stations (EVCS) in distribution networks expands the
cyber-attack surface and demands stringent requirements to
establish highly-secured communications. As the DER devices
are becoming cyber-physical systems and entering the broader
realm of the Internet of Things, early susceptibility to cyber
threats have been observed. For example, a PV device was
exposed to threats when adversaries attempted to gain access
via a compromised VPN tunnel connected to the Field Area
Network of a DC optimizer data manager [2]. A European PV
inverter manufacturer discovered over a dozen vulnerabilities,
including remote access vulnerabilities that could compromise
the PV equipment [3]. Traditional cybersecurity technologies
can have substantial false-positives and false-negatives with
the continuous expansion of networked DER devices [4], [5],
which could significantly impact grid operation. There is an
urgent need to develop innovative defense-in-depth strategies,
state-of-the-art cyber-security practices for solar PV systems,
DERs, aggregators, and utility grid operators for attack re-
silient and reliable operation of the U.S. power system [6].
To address these cybersecurity challenges and to incorporate
grid-support functions, power utilities and system operators at
different levels (ISOs/TSOs/DSOs) are upgrading their sys-
tems compliant to the DER interconnection standards includ-
ing grid-support advanced functions in the United States [7]
and world-wide [8]. Some large-scale investor-owned DER
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Fig. 2. Proposed DER Monitoring and Control Architecture including
ADMS, EMS, and Cyber Attack Surface
plants and utility-scale DER plants connect to utility operators
via fiber-optic lines, telephone lines, cellular modems, and
other radio relays, so there are several access points to these
systems [6]. Recent projects on cybersecurity for DER [9]–
[11] have attempted to explore device-centric and protocol-
centric cybersecurity properties and devise algorithms for
securing DER devices integrated to the grid. These methodolo-
gies may fail to provide adequate cybersecurity as the number
of DER devices increase in the grid operation. Therefore, it
is essential to develop a comprehensive CPS security analysis
for DERs using industry-grade software and hardware systems
to test and evaluate the cyber attack-defense algorithms. As
the subject of this paper, we present a cyber-physical DER
architecture and hardware-in-the-loop CPS testbed design in-
cluding real-time digital simulator, DER clients, aggregator,
DER utility server, and DERMS. The proposed DER CPS
testbed system is integrated with the existing CPS security
smart grid testbed [12] for the grid impact characteristics.
II. PROPOSED DER MONITORING AND CONTROL
ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 2 shows the proposed CPS control loop architecture
for the DER monitoring and control applications. The CPS of
DERs employed with different DER communication protocols
enable utility distribution system operators to centrally monitor
and control in real-time and provide performance and state
of the DER devices to the associated prosumers. The DER
monitoring and control of the geographically distributed de-
vices provide greater flexibility for system operators to ensure
efficient and stable grid operation, but, it drastically increases
the cyber attack surface of the DER integrated power grid.
As it is practically difficult to control each DER device, the
DER communication standards propose aggregation of various
geographically distributed devices, where the aggregation of a
group of DER devices forms distributed virtual power plant.
To optimally and efficiently address the grid requirements, the
TABLE I
SMART INVERTER FUNCTIONS
Immediate Controls Curve Controls



















High voltage disturbance response
curve (opModHVMustTrip)
High voltage momentary cessation
disturbance response curve
(opModHVMomentaryCessastion)
Low voltage must trip disturbance
response curve (opModLVMustTrip)






High frequency must trip disturbance
response curve (opModHFMustTrip)
Low frequency must trip disturbance
response curve (opModLFMustTrip)
Active Power set point
in Watts (opModTargetW)
Reactive Power set point
in VARs (opModTargetVAr)
TABLE II
ATTACK VECTORS AND THEIR IMPACTS ON DER SYSTEMS






























standards recommend to form the group-wise DER controls.
A possible scenario of the hierarchical configuration of groups
defined in common smart inverter profile (CSIP). Although the
aggregation of DER system provide flexibility to control the
set-points in response to the grid operation, it may increase the
attack surface as hostile entities can access the DER devices
remotely through the aggregator systems and affect multiple
systems, state variables, and dynamics of the grid. Moreover,
as the CPS infrastructure enables monitoring, control, and
reconfiguration of DER devices such as smart inverter units,
adversaries may exploit and gain access to the DER devices
remotely and manipulate their operation. Therefore, it is essen-
tial to deploy advanced cyber-defense mechanisms to provide
a CPS-aware situational awareness and anomaly detection so
that model-base mitigation strategies can be employed.
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Fig. 3. Proposed Hardware-in-the-Loop DER CPS Security Testbed Design and Architecture
A. CPS Control Loop
Fig. 2 shows the proposed CPS control loop architecture
for the DER systems for remote monitoring and control ap-
plications. At the utility control center, the Distributed Energy
Resource Management System (DERMS) receives measure-
ments and sends control commands over the utility wide-
area network from the geographically distributed aggregator
software systems. The aggregators can be utility-owned or
third-party-owned software systems, which can usually be
deployed at a private cloud, public cloud, or utility control
center premises. The DER plant controllers, referred to as
DER clients, send and receive signals to and from the third-
party aggregators or utility’s aggregator. We consider utility’s
aggregator software system to provide the functionality for the
direct communication between the DER clients and DERMS
scenario. The DERMS, which receives data from the Ad-
vanced Distribution Management System (ADMS), the Energy
Management System (EMS), and the DER plant controllers or
aggregators, prepares control signals such as voltage and fre-
quency setpoints, frequency droop and active power ramp-rate
settings, and automated generation control signals and sends
them to the DER plant controllers via the WAN. The DERMS
receives various measurements from the PV plant controllers
over the DER-WAN such as plant state data including voltage,
active and reactive power output, frequency, power factor, and
energy output, irradiance being received by the PV modules,
and the temperature of the modules.
As shown in the architecture, the possibility of cyber attacks
can occur either at the tier-1, tier-2 or both. The tier-1
communication is between the DER clients and aggregator
software systems. The tier-2 communication is between the
aggregators and DERMS. The California rule-21 and CSIP
recommends utility controlled cybersecurity at the tier-2 level.
The possible cybersecurity strategies include virtual private
networking (VPN) between the utility communication server
and each of the aggregator software systems.
B. DER System Operation and Functions
Table I shows the functions that a smart DER device such
as a smart inverter is capable of carrying out. These functions
include the Immediate Controls and the Curve Controls. Im-
Fig. 4. Protocol Standards for DER Communication
mediate controls can be either in the default mode or the event-
triggered mode. In the default mode, the smart device follows
the default function settings while in the event-triggered mode,
special functions related to the specific predefined events that
occur in the grid are triggered. The curve controls are functions
that are specific to the system operation. Table I lists down
some of these functions with regards to a smart inverter as
per California rule-21.
C. Stealthy Cyber attack Vectors and Impacts
Table II shows a brief overview of various cyberattacks
and their impacts that the existing Solar PV systems are
susceptible to. The attacks include: data integrity attacks,
Denial of Service attacks, timing attacks, replay attacks, or
other forms of man-in-the-middle attacks. These attacks can
be targeted on the measurement signals or control signals.
In addition, sophisticated attacks include coordinated cyber
attacks that target multiple control loops (sensing and control)
simultaneously. Any successful attack may have negative
impacts on the DERs and DER integrated distribution grid
system and hence the transmission system depending on the
capacity of the solar power plant, magnitude and location(s)
of the attacks.
III. PROPOSED HIL CPS TESTBED ARCHITECTURE
Fig. 3 shows the HIL CPS testbed implementation architec-
ture including the selected DER communication protocols for
4
Fig. 5. Modified IEEE 13 Bus Distribution Grid with Integration of PVs
Fig. 6. Specifications for individual PV modules
monitoring and controlling the DER devices. The significant
components of the HIL CPS testbed include - 1) Real-time
digital simulator module: It emulates characteristics for DER
devices such as solar PV. 2) DER client module: It consists of
smart inverter application programming interface (API) to re-
ceive and send signals to the DER devices via Modbus or IEC
61850 protocol. The DER client module also includes plant-
wide SCADA/EMS software system to monitor and control a
group of smart inverter APIs. 3) Aggregator module: These are
two-fold – a) Utility-owned aggregator software system and b)
Third-party-owned aggregator software system. These will acts
as servers to the DER client under the tier-1 communication,
and clients to the utility server under the tier-2 communica-
tion. 4) DER utility server module: It communicates to the
aggregator modules via DER communication protocols such
as IEEE 2030.5 [1] and exchange information across the the
DERMS, DMS, EMS, SCADA and other distribution control
center applications. 5) DERMS module: It is the signification
module to conduct analysis on the distribution grid systems
and populate required grid-support functions as stated in the
Section II. The DERMS module interacts with the DER utility
server to receive and send signals from and to the DERs.
A. DER Communication Scenarios
There are primarily four communication scenarios exist
between the DER utility server and DER clients are - 1) Direct
communication between utility provider (utility’s aggregator)
and DER client, 2) Direct connection between utility provider
(utility’s aggregator) and large-scale DER client comprising of
generation facility EMS, 3) Indirect communication between
utility provider and DER client through a third-party aggrega-
tor, and 4) A mutual agreement based communication between
utility and DER client
Fig. 7. Time varying irradiance values received by individual PV modules
Fig. 8. Irradiance received by individual PV Modules
B. DER Communication Protocols
Fig. 4 shows the hierarchy of DER standard protocols. IEEE
1547 is used for the DER interconnection to the grid. There
are five active standards for the DER communication between
the geographically distributed DER devices and utility.
IV. CASE STUDY
Fig. 5 shows the modified IEEE 13-bus distribution grid
that we used for the case study. It has 14 buses including
the bus (650) that integrates the distribution grid to the main
grid. There are a total of 11 PV modules that are connected
to the various nodes. PV modules connected to Node 634 are
operating at 0.415kV and the rest of the PV modules operate at
4.16kV . The following modifications were made to the IEEE
13-bus distribution grid in for this case stude: 1) PV units
were connected to buses 634, 675, 692, 680, 652, 611, 646,
and 645; 2) The distributed load along the line 632 to 671 was
replaces by a lumped load a bus 632; 3) The voltage regulator
between nodes 632 and 650 was substituted by a transformer
(Yg-Yg), and a new node 651 was inserted; and 4) All were
considered with grounded star (Yg) concoction.
The specifications of all the PV modules are given in the
table in Fig. 6. It shows the PV modules names; the buses
that the respective modules are connected to; the active and
reactive power generated by the modules; the terminal voltage
magnitudes and angles of the PV modules; and the maximum
rated active power generation for each module. Each PV unit
model is based on the PSS/e Photovoltaic System Model and
includes a converter model (PVGU1), a controller (PVEU1), a
solar panel (PANELU1), and an irradiance model (IRRADU1).
Real-time simulation of this grid was carried out on OPAL-
RT real-time digital simulator to capture the dynamics of the
microgrid. To simulate the phenomena of sunrise and sunset
on a shorter timescale of 25 seconds, an irradiance profile
as depicted in Fig. 7 was considered. The irradiance profile
shows that irradiance for all modules first increases starting
at TIME1 up to TIME4 and then starts to decrease from
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Fig. 9. Total Power Output of PV Modules vs Network Input Power Flow
Fig. 10. Active Power Output of PV Modules
TIME5 up to TIME6, having the lowest irradiance levels
at TIME6, that is, after 20 seconds of simulation time. Fig.
8 depicts the same irradiance information on a graph for all
PV modules. Fig. 9 shows the total active and reactive power
generated by the PV modules and the active and reactive power
injected by the main grid into the microgrid. The graph clearly
shows that the active power generated by the PV modules
reaches its maximum around 12 seconds when the irradiance
is also maximum and reaches its minimum value around 20
seconds when the irradiance is also minimum. When the PV
module active power output is maximum, the active power
injection into the microgrid is minimum. In fact, the there is
a reverse active power flow from the microgrid to the main
grid from approximately 8 seconds to 13 seconds. The reactive
power output from the PV modules flows from the microgrid
to the main grid from around 13 seconds right after the reverse
active power flow ends. Fig. 10 and 11 show the active and
reactive power output for all the PV modules.
Fig. 12 shows the CPU usage for the real-time digital
simulation of the distribution grid model on OPAL-RT. With
a time step of 10 milliseconds, the CPU uage is only 4.4%
having a mean computation time of 439.71 microseconds and
the CPU remaining idle for 95.58% of the time
V. CONCLUSION
We proposed a high-fidelity HIL CPS security testbed
architecture and design for grid impact characteristic analysis
against various cyber attack vectors with industry grade soft-
ware and hardware systems. We have conducted an experiment
on a modified IEEE 13 bus distribution grid with 11 PV
modules and demonstrated 100% real-time performance and
zero overruns for a time step of 10 milliseconds and 4.4% CPU
usage of 439.71 microseconds. The proposed testbed architec-
ture provides grid impact characteristics for integration of DER
Fig. 11. Reactive Power Output of PV Modules
Fig. 12. Real-Time Digital Simulator OPAL-RT CPU usage
in the smart grid with high-fidelity which is indispensable for
the development and testing of new tools and technologies for
cybersecurity in the DER integrated-grid.
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